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Abstract
We present three hierarchical models for the evolution of composi-
tional language. Each has the basic structure of a two-sender/one re-
ceiver Lewis signaling game augmented with executive agents who can
learn to influence the behavior of the basic senders and receiver. With
each game, we move from stronger to weaker modeling assumptions.
The first game shows how the basic senders and receiver might evolve
a compositional language when the two senders have pre-established
representational roles. The second shows how the two senders might
coevolve representational roles as they evolve a reliable compositional
language. Both of these games impose an efficiency demand on the
agents. The third game shows how costly signaling alone might lead
role-free agents to evolve a compositional language.
1 Introduction
Humans and some animals use languages that allow for the functional
composition of basic terms to form more complex expressions. The
meanings of the more complex expressions are influenced, sometimes
determined, by the meanings of their parts. Animals where there is
compelling evidence for such compositional languages include putty
nosed monkeys [2, 3], Campbell’s Monkeys [20], suricates [18], prairie
dogs [12, 29], and some species of birds [27].1 Here we are concerned
1The sort of composition exhibited can be subtle. Suricates, for example, compose
acoustically two aspects of their call to indicate predictor class and urgency.
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with how a basic compositional language might evolve. The aim is to
model the evolution of a very simple compositional language using the
basic structure of a Lewis signaling game.2
The simplest sort of Lewis-signaling game involves two players: a
sender and a receiver. The sender is equipped with N signals which
she can send to the receiver, and the receiver is equipped with N acts
to choose from. Each play of the game, nature chooses one of N states
with unbiased probabilities and reveals it to the sender. The sender
then sends one of her N signals to the receiver, who cannot see the
state of nature directly. The receiver then chooses an act conditional
on the signal. Each state of nature corresponds to exactly one act, and
the players both win if and only if the act chosen by the receiver cor-
responds to the current state of nature. When successful, the agents
evolve a signaling system where the sender associates exactly one sig-
nal with each state of nature, the receiver associates each of these
signals with the corresponding act, and both players always succeed
regardless of the state of nature.
Signaling games have been studied extensively under different learn-
ing and evolutionary dynamics, and there are a number of analytic and
simulation results [1, 14, 24, 5, 9, 15, 16]. And many variations of the
basic game have also been studied. These include games where nature
is biased, where the agents have too few or too many signals, and
where there are multiple senders or receivers [4, 6, 25].
The games we are concerned with here have two basic senders and
one receiver, but they are distinguished from other such games by
their hierarchical structure. In these games the basic agents play a
sender or receiver role as in a standard Lewis signaling game while
the executive sender and executive receiver track and control aspects
of the behavior of the basic agents. Together the agents must evolve a
simple compositional language in order to be successful. In the special
composition game, the basic agents have preassigned representational
roles which they have to learn to perform while the executive agents
learn how to control basic agents with those particular assigned roles.
In the role-free composition game, the basic agents have no preassigned
representational roles. Here the executive agents have to learn what
roles the basic agents are playing and how they might be used for
successful action even as the basic agents evolve representational roles.
The dispositions of all of the agents coevolve as the compositional
2See [11] and [30] for alternative models of compositional signaling.
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language evolves. The general composition game is just like the role-
free game except that no explicit efficiency demands are placed on the
basic agents. Here the agents evolve a compositional language as a
result of costly signaling alone.
Costly signaling is ubiquitous in nature. In bacteria, and other
microorganisms, each signal sent may involve producing a molecule
which diffuses into the vicinity. Here each signal has a metabolic cost.
For higher organisms, if giving an alarm call exposes an individual to
increased immediate danger, then pausing to give two signals might
increase danger. Again, this gives each signal a cost. More gener-
ally, costly signaling in nature is a well-studied phenomena with an
extensive literature.3
The games we are concerned with here are significantly more subtle
than Lewis’ original signaling game. They are generalized signaling
games with a hierarchical structure. As with simpler signaling games,
generalized signaling games might self-assemble from the ritualization
of individual actions of the agents [7, 8]. The behavior of the agents in
the complex game is forged in the context of an evolutionary process.
In the present models, this is a learning dynamics. We will refer to
the parts of the model as agents, but they may be understood as
functional components of a social group or of an individual agent.
2 The special composition game
The special composition game is a variant of the traditional Lewis
signaling game. It is a cooperative game with two basic senders and
one basic receiver where the agents must evolve a particular sort of
signaling system in order to be uniformly successful. In addition to
the basic agents, the game has an executive sender and an executive
receiver. These hierarchical agents can learn to influence the behavior
of the basic agents.
The state of nature features two properties and a context. For
concreteness we will take the two properties to be color, which is
either black or white, and animal, which is either dog or cat. The
state of nature on a particular play of the game will feature either
black dog, black cat, white dog, or white cat. The context indicates
which of the properties the receiver will need to know in order to
3See, for example, [28], [23], [31], and [22].
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perform a successful action on the current play. The context is either
color, animal, or both.
The game is played by two senders and an executive sender and
one receiver and an executive receiver. While we will drop this con-
dition for the role-free and general composition games, on the special
composition game each basic sender is assigned a particular property
and only has access to that aspect of nature. So one basic sender sees
color and the other sees animal. The executive sender sees context.
Initially, the executive sender randomly determines whether the color
sender, the animal sender, or both will send a signal. Over time the
executive sender may learn what type of signal the current context
demands.
The basic receiver sees the signals sent by the two basic senders
and which sender sent each. The executive receiver also sees who
sent the signals. The executive receiver determines whether the basic
receiver will interpret the signal as a color, an animal, or both. The
receiver performs an action based on his interpretation. The receiver’s
possible actions are black, white, dog, cat, black dog, white dog, black
cat, or white cat. See figure 1.
The agents are successful on a particular play of the game if and
only if (1) the receiver performs the correct action given the current
context and (2) the senders only sent the signals required for success
given the context. To be successful, then, the receiver must match the
state of nature and the senders must be as efficient as possible, not
sending any irrelevant signals. We will suppose that the agents learn
by simple reinforcement.4
The game is implemented as follows. On each play, nature chooses
a value for each of the two properties and the context randomly and
with uniform probabilities. The executive sender is equipped with an
urn for each of the three possible contexts color, animal, and both.
Each urn begins with one ball of each type color-sender (c), animal-
sender (a), and both (b). Upon witnessing the context, the executive
sender randomly draws a ball from the corresponding urn. The drawn
ball determines whether the color sender, animal sender, or both will
send a signal.
The color sender is equipped with a white urn and a black urn, each
initially containing a 0 ball and a 1 ball. If the executive sender draws
a ball that requires the color sender to send a signal, the color sender












































randomly draws a ball from the urn corresponding to the color she
sees and sends the corresponding signal. Similarly, the animal sender
is equipped with a dog urn and a cat urn, each initially containing a 0
ball and a 1 ball. If required to do so by the executive sender, she
draws a ball from the urn corresponding to the animal she sees and
sends the corresponding signal.
The receiver has four urns, one for every ordered pair of signals she
might receive from the color sender and animal sender respectively:
00, 01, 10, and 11. Each urn begins with one ball for each of the
possible color-animal pairs black dog, white dog, black cat, or white
cat. If both senders send a signal, then the receiver draws a ball at
random from the corresponding urn. If only one sender sends a signal,
then the receiver randomly chooses, with unbiased probabilities, one
of the two urns that correspond to the sender’s signal then draws a
ball at random from that urn.
The executive receiver determines how the receiver will interpret
the type of signal she received. This interpretation together with the
ball the receiver drew determines how the receiver will act. The exec-
utive receiver is equipped with a color-sender urn, an animal-sender
urn, and a both urn. Each of these initially contains a color ball, an
animal ball, and a both ball. The ball drawn by the executive receiver
determines what type of act the receiver takes as salient given the sig-
nal(s) she received. Specifically, if the executive receiver draws a both
ball, then the basic receiver simply performs the action corresponding
to the ball she drew, but if the executive receiver draws a color or
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animal ball, then the basic receiver performs the action correspond-
ing to the color or animal indicated on the ball she drew. The balls
drawn by executive receiver and the basic receiver, then, determine
whether the receiver’s action is black, white, dog, cat, black dog, white
dog, black cat, or white cat.
Again, the agents are successful on a particular play of the game
if and only if (1) the receiver performs the correct action given the
current context and (2) the senders only send the signals required for
success given the context. The second condition requires the senders to
be as efficient as possible given the current context. Namely, they are
only successful if a signal from the color sender is sent only when the
context requires color and a signal from the animal sender is sent only
when the context requires animal. One might think of this condition
as imposing a significant cost on inefficient signaling even if it leads
to the right action. It is this condition that drives the evolution of a
compositional language.
If a play of the game is successful, then each agent who was involved
in that particular play returns the ball she drew to the urn from which
she drew it and adds another a ball of the same type to that urn.
Otherwise, each agent simply returns the ball she drew to the urn
from which she drew it.
On simulation, the agents in the special composition game nearly
always evolve a successful and optimally efficient compositional lan-
guage. See table 1. As they evolve to satisfy the demands of transmit-
ting information but not transmitting too much, the meanings of the
individual terms and the composite expressions coevolve. Specifically,
each of the color sender’s terms comes to represent a color, each of the
animal sender’s terms comes to represent an animal, and functional
composition comes to represent the conjunction of the two properties.
Simulation results:




The executive sender always learns to correctly read the context
and the executive receiver always learns to correctly interpret the type
of signal sent. Indeed, in this game, reinforcement learning guaran-
tees that they will learn to coordinate between the current context
and how the signal is interpreted by the receiver. Suppose that the
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context requires only color. The agents are only successful if the exec-
utive sender instructs only the color sender to send her signal and the
executive receiver instructs the receiver to perform a color-type action.
So, on the reinforcement dynamics, the executive sender’s color urn
can only ever have color-sender balls added to it and the executive
receiver’s color-sender urn can only have color balls added to it. And
similarly for contexts that require only animal or both for success.
This means that the executive sender and executive receiver always
evolve the same coordinated conventions for representing the context
and interpreting the type of signal sent on the special composition
game.5
The color sender, animal sender, and receiver, however, have sig-
nificant freedom in what conventions they may evolve. One almost
always (in 0.97 of runs) finds that the agents evolve a maximally ef-
ficient and successful compositional language on simulation, but one
sees every permutation of successful conventions that allows for this.







































5But, as we will see, this is not the case for the role-free and general composition games.
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3 The role-free composition game
Preassigning each basic sender to one of the two properties imposes
significant structure on the special composition game up front, and, as
we saw, it is this structure that guarantees that the executive sender
and executive receiver always learn to coordinate the representation
of the context and interpretation of the signal type. In the role-free
composition game the basic senders have no preassigned representa-
tional roles. Rather, they are both simply shown the full basic state
of nature.
Since each basic sender lacks the expressive resources on his own
to represent the full state, they must evolve representational roles in
order to be successful. Further, the executive sender must learn what
these emerging roles are as they evolve in order to know what signal to
send for each context. And the executive receiver must learn what the
signal types are as they evolve in order to correctly interpret the signal.
If the agents are successful, they will have evolved a compositional
language where the representational and interpretational roles of the
agents coevolved with the meanings of terms and the significance of





































bd wd bc wc
bd wd bc wc
who sent?what context?
The role-free composition game is very much like the special com-
positional game, but there are two important differences. First, since
there are no preassigned roles, there is, at least initially, no color
sender or animal sender. Rather, on each play of the game, the two
basic senders, sender A and sender B, are both shown one of the four
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possible basic states black dog, white dog, black cat, or white cat. Each
sender is equipped with an urn corresponding to each of these states
and each urn begins with a 0-ball and a 1-ball. The balls, again, indi-
cate the possible signals. Since each sender still has only two possible
signals for each of the four states, neither is able to convey the full
state alone. To be successful, they must somehow partition the state
of nature in a way which lets them give complementary information
about the state of nature to the receiver.
The second difference from the special composition game concerns
the conditions for success. In the basic composition game, a play
was successful if and only if the receiver performs the correct action
given the state of nature and the senders send precisely the type of
information demanded by the current context. Since there is no pre-
established color sender or animal sender, this second condition does
not even make sense in the role-free composition game. The weaker
efficiency condition for the role-free game, then, is that both senders
send a signal if and only if the current context requires maximal infor-
mation. So the full conditions for a successful play are (1) the receiver
performs the correct action given the current context and (2) both
senders sent a signal if and only if the current context requires both
color and animal. Again, we suppose that all agents learn by simple
reinforcement.
As can be seen in table 2, the agents do very well overall evolving
a compositional language on this more subtle game. But the table
just reports the mean cumulative success rate over all the runs. This
misses two important aspects of the behavior of the game. First,
most of the time (0.736) the composite system evolves nearly perfect
(better than 0.98 cumulative success rate) signaling. And second, the
composite system sometimes gets stuck in one of several suboptimal
pooling equilibria that exhibit significantly worse cumulative success
rates. We will discuss each of these behaviors in turn.
Simulation results:




When the agents are optimally successful in the role-free composi-
tion game, the senders evolve representational roles and the executive
sender learns which roles each sender has evolved. The meanings of
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the individual terms and the meanings of the composite expressions
coevolve to allow the executive sender to satisfy the expressive de-
mands required by each possible context. As the agents learn when
basic terms and complex expressions are needed, their success and
failure in the use of the basic expressions influences the meanings of
the complex expressions, and their success and failure in the use of the
complex expressions influences the meanings of the basic expressions.
In this way, the semantic function of composition coevolves with the
meanings of the more basic terms.
The evolution of functional composition here, as in the special com-
position game, is driven by the contextual demands. To be successful
the agents must evolve a system that allows them to communicate pre-
cisely the information required for successful action by the receiver on
the current play and no more. On simple reinforcement learning, the
agents are not directly punished for sending more information than
necessary, but they are also not rewarded. The simulation results
show that this is typically enough to evolve a compositional language
that allows for optimal signaling.
Unlike the special composition game, there is no single canonical
convention that evolves between the executive sender’s representation
of the context and the the executive receiver’s interpretation of the sig-
nal type in the role-free game. Rather, when optimal signaling evolves,
there are two possible conventions that the system might exhibit, each
corresponding to a particular assignment of color and animal roles to
the two senders (see the figures below).
Since there are no pre-established roles for the senders, when the
system evolves optimal signaling, sender-A sometimes evolves to be
the color sender and sender B the animal sender and sometimes it is
the other way around. Importantly, color and animal properties must
be respected by the partition the basic senders evolve in order for the
composite system to evolve optimal signaling. While there are other
partitions of the four color-animal states that the senders might evolve
that would allow them to communicate which of the four basic states
of nature was observed, since the contextual demands are either color,
animal, or both, the only way for the executive sender to always be
able to satisfy the partition of demands is for there eventually to be
a color sender and an animal sender available. So for the composite
system to be successful, the two senders must adjust to this constraint
as they evolve how they partition nature.









































with two possible signals, a single receiver, and no context that must
be satisfied. Here both senders just always send a signal. On simula-
tion, this system typically evolves optimal signaling with simple rein-
forcement learning and no favored partitions of nature. The system is
equally likely to evolve either of the two possible optimally effective
partitions and either of the two possible assignments of each to the
two senders [4, 5].6 In the role-free composition game, in contrast,
there is a single favored partition imposed by the game’s contextual
demands. More specifically, since the executive sender must be able
to express precisely these properties both individually and together,
color and animal might be thought of as “natural kinds” given the de
facto payoffs for different contexts. But, of course, different contex-
tual demands would individuate different “nature kinds” in this weak
sense of the notion.
When the system evolves optimal signaling, one sender takes the
role of representing color and the other takes the role of representing
animal and composition represents the simple conjunction of these two
properties. But on the role-free composition game the agents some-









































times fail to evolve an optimal signaling system. When this happens,
the language they evolve and how it works can be significantly more
subtle.
Consider the simulated run of the game that resulted in the player
mappings in figure 5. Here sender B has evolved to be a color sender.
Color-animal pairs in which the color is white are mapped to 1 and
those where the color is black are mapped to 0. Sender A, however, is
neither a color sender nor an animal sender. She sends both white dog
and black cat to 0, so she she cannot by herself distinguish between
either color or animal. If the context requires color, the executive
sender uses sender B. Such plays are always successful. If the context
requires animal, then if the executive sender uses sender A, the agents
will only succeed half of the time. But when the context requires both
color and animal, the agents are always successful. For black dog they
send 10, for white dog they send 01, for black cat they send 00, and for
white cat they send 11. Since the agents are always successful when
just animal is required and when both color and animal are required,
and since they are successful half the time when just color is required,




2 · 13 ≈ 0.833, which is
approximately the observed success rate on runs where this structure
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Composition in this case does not involve the simple conjunction of
color and animal properties. While sender B’s terms refer to black and
white, sender A’s terms do not individuate between colors or animals.
Rather, the referents of A’s terms cross-cut both animal and color to
individuate between (white dog or black cat) and (white cat or black
dog). Given the salient contexts presented by nature, A’s terms are
entirely useless by themselves. This failure in efficiently marshaling
the representational resources of the agents has the consequence that
if the context requires just animal, the agents are helpless and cannot
do better than chance.
But sender A’s terms are useful when composed with sender B’s
terms. When the context requires both animal and color, B’s term
communicates a color and, together with A’s term, also selects an an-
imal. It is not that A’s terms are meaningless. Rather, it is that they
are never useful on their own given the contextual demands. Here
7Less interesting things, such as the basic agents evolving the opposite partition to that
used by the executive agents or the executive receiver never choosing a certain context
like color or animal, happen at about 0.05 frequency.
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functional composition evolves to produce useful expressions from
terms that are not always useful alone.
In natural language we routinely employ expressions that play im-
portant semantic roles in combination with other expressions but are
relatively useless on their own. English language adverbs, adjectives,
and pronouns often behave this way. While the term only is rarely
useful on its own, expressions like only child or only decaf have precise
meanings that may allow one to usefully characterize states of nature
and, hence, facilitate successful action.
4 The general composition game
The general composition game is precisely like the role-free game ex-
cept for how actions are reinforced. In the games we have considered
so far the agents are only successful if they both choose the correct
act and utilize the minimum number of signals necessary for the given
context. In contrast, the general composition game rewards successful
action however it might be achieved but imposes a fixed cost to each
signal. And, importantly, like the role-free game, the basic senders
have no pre-established representational roles.
The general composition game introduces three new parameters to
the role-free game: simple-context payoff, complex-context payoff, and
signal cost. Now when the agents choose the correct act, regardless of
the number of signals sent, they get a basic payoff. If the context for
that play was simple (color or animal), then the reward is the simple-
context payoff. If the context was both, agents receive the complex-
context payoff. These payoffs might be equal in some situations, but
one might also imagine situations where the rewards for success are
greater in a complex context where more information is required. If
the receiver’s action is not successful, the basic payoff is zero.
Reinforcements are a function of both basic payoffs and signaling
costs. Specifically, the fixed cost of each signal is subtracted from the
basic payoff and the corresponding number of balls are added to or
subtracted from the agents’ urns.8 If the agents are unsuccessful, then
the basic payoff is zero but since they still have signaling costs to pay,
they will lose balls from the urns that led to the failed action.9 Agents
8Note that this may involve adding or subtracting fractions of balls depending on the
specific payoffs and costs involved.
9If a punishment would ever push the number of balls of a particular type to something
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are thus reinforced the strongest when they use the least number of
signals to achieve the greatest reward, and they are punished if the
signal costs they incur are higher than their basic payoff.10
Suppose that the simple-context payoff is 1.5, the complex-context
payoff is 2, and signal cost is 0.5.11 One might measure the agents’
overall success rate by just tracking the proportion of plays in which
they chose the correct act. In order to give a better sense of how
the agents’ dispositions evolve and for the purposes of comparison to
the results of the simple and role-free games, we will measure their
success on the stricter condition that they (1) chose the correct act
and (2) send the minimum number of signals needed to convey that
act. Importantly, note that, regardless of how successful their actions
may be, the agents have only evolved to use a compositional language
if they in fact exhibit this sort efficiency.
On this measure, after 1,000 runs of 108 plays each, the mean over-
all cumulative success rate on simulation was found to be 0.9942. Of
these runs, 0.975 exhibited near perfect and efficient signaling. The
agents crosscut nature (i.e. develop suboptimal roles) in only 0.022 of
runs. In addition, agents approach the perfectly efficient signaling rel-
atively quickly, with rates comparable to those in the special signaling
game, as can be seen in the table below:
Simulation results for the general composition game:




Setting the simple-context payoff and the complex-context payoff
both to 2 and keeping a signal cost of 0.5 produces a slightly lower
overall success rate of 0.9733 with 0.936 of runs near perfect play. The
fact that the agents are somewhat less successful in this case seems to
have less to do with the relationship between the relative payoffs of
the simple and complex contexts and more to do with the relationship
between the basic payoffs and signal cost. When the basic payoffs are
increased and/or the signal cost is decreased, the agents do not do
less than one, we set the number of balls of that type to one.
10There is ample evidence of signaling in biological and human interactions.
11This produces payoffs in the general game that are similar to the payoffs in the role-free
game above.
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as well at evolving a successful a compositional language. This can
be seen by the fact that when the simple-context payoff is 1.5, the
complex-context payoff is 2, and signal cost is 0.3 the agents evolve
nearly perfect signaling 0.61 of the time; and when the signal cost is
0.1 they evolve near perfect signaling only 0.26 of the time.
The relationship between the basic payoffs and the signal cost
drives the evolution of a successful compositional language. On the
first several plays of the game, where no signals or acts are salient,
agents will usually fail but occasionally succeed by chance. While
these early successes can become a foothold on which to build a suc-
cessful compositional language, there is also a chance that they will
start the agents down a path towards a suboptimal equilibrium. One
way that this can happen is if their action is successful when the
context is both and one basic sender is cross-cutting nature. While a
cross-cutting equilibrium will succeed if the context is both, it may not
when the cross-cutting agent is chosen to send her signal alone since
cross-cutting signals are useless in the simple contexts of color or an-
imal. The fact that signals have significant costs means that when a
cross-cutting sender’s signal results in a failure in a simple context,
the agents subtract balls from their urns and increase the likelihood
of a more successful compositional language evolving, one that works
well both for simple and complex contexts.12
5 Discussion
The three models for the evolution of compositional language con-
sidered here show how basic terms and functional composition might
coevolve in a hierarchical signaling game under simple reinforcement
with efficiency conditions on success and, in the case of the general
composition game, under simple reinforcement learning with costly
signaling.
When the agents are successful in the general composition game,
the basic senders adopt representational roles and evolve signaling
conventions appropriate to each role, the executive sender learns which
roles each sender has adopted and how to use her signals to represent
the current context, the executive receiver learns how to interpret the
12Cross-cutting equilibria are possible and occur on about 0.02 of the runs with the
original parameter settings. If the context is repeatedly both, the agents’ urns may fill too
quickly for ball withdrawals to steer them away from the cross-cutting equilibria later.
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type of expression sent, and the basic receiver learns how to interpret
the specific content of each expression type. The meanings of the
individual terms and the composite expressions coevolve to satisfy the
expressive demands required by the salient contexts. In this sense, the
semantic function of composition coevolves with the meanings of the
individual terms.
The evolution of functional composition is required to satisfy the
contextual demands under the efficiency constraints. If the agents
were always reinforced for sending maximal information, then there
would be no need for the individual terms to evolve their own mean-
ings.
When the agents evolve an optimally successful system in the gen-
eral composition game, both the individual terms and the composite
expressions are useful. But we have also shown how terms might evolve
that are only useful when composed with other meaningful terms.13
13We would like to thank in particular Travis LaCroix and Josh Armstrong for their
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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